Tobacco companies rely on corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives to improve their public image and advance their political objectives, which include thwarting or undermining tobacco control policies. For these reasons, implementation guidelines for the World Health Organization's Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) recommend curtailing or prohibiting tobacco industry CSR. To understand how and where major tobacco companies focus their CSR resources, we explored CSR-related content on 4 US and 4 multinational tobacco company websites in February 2014. The websites described a range of CSR-related activities, many common across all companies, and no programs were unique to a particular company.
Introduction
The tobacco industry has embraced the concept of corporate social responsibility (CSR), the notion that corporations have an obligation to address or ameliorate their broader social and/or environmental impacts. 1 Examples of tobacco industry CSR initiatives include the creation of youth smoking prevention (YSP) programs and voluntary marketing codes, 2, 3 and financial support for nongovernmental organizations. 4, 5 Research has shown that tobacco industry CSR initiatives are powerful political tools, used by tobacco manufacturers to improve their public image and enhance their credibility, 4, 6 gain access to and influence policymakers, 4, 5, 7 avoid or weaken regulation, 8 influence the tobacco control agenda, 6 and create allies. 5, 6, 9 Many tobacco company CSR initiatives originated in high income nations, particularly the US 10 ; however, as the tobacco industry expands into low and middle income countries, it adopts strategies that have been successful in thwarting public health and creating a tobacco-favorable policy environment in higher income countries, including CSR initiatives. 11, 12 The World Health Organization's Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC), entered into force in 2005, addresses tobacco industry CSR via Article 5.3 and Article 13. 13 Article 5.3 cautions treaty signatories to protect tobacco control policies from "commercial and other vested interests of the tobacco industry" 14 ; implementation guidelines recommend denormalizing or regulating tobacco industry CSR by, for example, prohibiting public disclosure of tobacco industry CSR projects. 14 Article 13 goes further, requiring parties to ban all forms of sponsorship and explicitly defining tobacco industry CSR as such. 15 Nonetheless, to date, only a small number of parties to the treaty have prohibited tobacco industry CSR as a form of sponsorship (approximately 28 of 180 nations). 16 
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Corporate websites are one means by which tobacco companies communicate their CSR agendas and practices to a broader public. Websites are more dynamic and less expensive than traditional communication channels, and allow tobacco companies to sidestep media gatekeepers, communicating quickly and directly with various audiences -policymakers, potential employees, investors, consumers, the general public, and potential jurors. 17 A small body of research has examined CSR-related material on tobacco company websites, focusing on health-related information [18] [19] [20] and image repair techniques 21 on the Philip Morris USA website, and changes over time in statements regarding addiction on several tobacco companies' websites. 22 However, no studies have documented the full range of CSR-related content on tobacco company websites. In this paper, we examine the types of CSR programs that tobacco companies describe on their websites, highlighting similarities and differences across companies and comparing US to multinational companies. We also examine the countries where those programs take place, noting both the regions with the most concentrated CSR activities and whether countries with CSR programs are parties to the FCTC. Identifying how and where tobacco company CSR resources are concentrated can highlight those areas where the industry perceives itself to be particularly vulnerable. This, in turn, may provide insight into areas that policymakers and advocates might most usefully exploit in countering the industry or suggest programs whose credibility may be called into question (as was the case in the US with tobacco industry-sponsored YSP programs). American Inc. (RAI), and Lorillard (which was purchased by RAI in 2014, but maintains a separate website). We excluded RJ Reynolds Tobacco Company because it offered a very cursory view of the company's CSR activities, directing website visitors instead to its parent company, RAI. On each website, we searched for CSR-related information; an initial review of 3 websites revealed that this was typically encapsulated under a "responsibility" or "sustainability" heading on the home page. However, we also searched the websites for any mention of programs or positions that have been identified in the literature as CSR initiatives (e.g., YSP programs, acknowledgement of the health consequences of smoking) 2, 19 regardless of where they were located on the website.
The second author downloaded CSR content from each company's website as PDF documents in February, 2014, with each PDF representing a webpage with a unique URL. She imported the PDF documents into NVivo 9.0 for categorization of types of CSR mentioned and the countries in which CSR projects were conducted (if mentioned). In the majority of cases, the categories she used to classify types of CSR were those employed by tobacco companies (i.e., the category "domestic violence" was drawn from the PMI web page entitled "domestic violence"). However, in some cases she combined categories used by some tobacco companies into one broader category (e.g., "child labor" and other tobacco farming-related issues were merged into "supply chain"). Because categorizing this information required minimal interpretation, we did not involve a second coder or conduct a formal analysis of inter-rater 5 reliability; however, the first author confirmed the identification and categorization of CSR programs mentioned on the websites.
In analyzing the data, we summarized CSR areas of focus for each tobacco company and the countries in which CSR programs were conducted, noting programs and regions that garnered the most tobacco company attention. We also reviewed the website text that pertained to the CSR focus areas that were universally mentioned in order to summarize qualitatively similarities and differences in companies' approaches towards these common CSR focus areas.
Results

CSR focus areas
Tobacco company websites described a range of CSR-related activities (table 1). Four CSR focus areas were universally mentioned: YSP programs, voluntary marketing standards, acknowledgement of smoking's health harms, and management of the tobacco supply chain.
There were no programs that were unique to a particular tobacco company, although some, such as smoking cessation and domestic violence prevention, were less common across companies. With the exception of JTI, the multinational companies had more CSR-related webpages than the US companies (table 1).
Universally mentioned CSR focus areas
Youth smoking prevention
Websites focused on two types of tobacco company-sponsored efforts with the ostensible goal of preventing smoking initiation among youth. The first, mentioned by all companies except Altria, consisted of financial support for the creation and maintenance of retailer-based proof-of-age programs such as We Card (US), 8 We Expect ID (Canada), and Citizen Card (UK). The second, mentioned only by US-based companies and PMI, was support for or creation and sponsorship of tobacco educational programs for youth. Examples included RAI's "Right Decisions Right Now" program for middle schoolers and Altria's "Success 360°," a partnership with a variety of youth-focused organizations.
Marketing standards
All tobacco companies stated on their websites that they limited their marketing to adults. All US companies except Altria devoted more text to the issue of marketing than multinational companies (an average of 835 words for US companies (excluding Altria), versus 172 words for multinationals). Both PM USA and RAI mentioned compliance with the US 1998
Master Settlement Agreement's advertising restrictions (which include prohibitions on targeting youth, most forms of outdoor advertising, product placement, and branded merchandise).
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In addition, PM USA stated its opposition to smoking scenes in movies and mentioned its efforts to encourage the film industry to eliminate such scenes in youth-oriented films; RAI highlighted its "stringent" age verification process for its marketing database. BAT, Imperial, and PMI discussed more general marketing principles, such as "not misleading about smoking's risks" (BAT) and "respect[ing] global standards of decency and local cultures, traditions, and practices" (PMI). 7 
Supply chain
As used on tobacco company websites, the term "supply chain" referred to the individuals and organizations involved in supplying materials to tobacco manufacturers. Two supply chain issues were commonly addressed by tobacco companies on their websites: child labor and the environmental impact of tobacco growing. All but two tobacco companies (RAI and JTI) addressed child labor on their websites, with most mentioning support for the Eliminating Child Labor in Tobacco Foundation, co-founded by BAT in 2000. 26 Imperial's and PMI's websites were the most expansive on the topic, discussing in detail their support for projects in Tanzania (Imperial) and Argentina (PMI) that aimed to ameliorate child labor in tobacco growing communities. Although both companies saw their support for such projects as important, they stated that governments, not corporations, ultimately were responsible for ending child labor practices.
With the exception of Lorillard, all tobacco companies discussed on their websites their efforts to minimize the negative impact of tobacco growing on the environment. (Research has shown that tobacco company efforts to "green" their supply chains started in the 2000s.) 27 These seven companies all mentioned their support for or promotion of sustainable agricultural practices among farmers (e.g., crop rotation, soil mulching, water conservation, and pesticide minimization). RAI was the only company to put a dollar figure to this support, noting that its subsidiary, Santa Fe Natural Tobacco Company, had provided over $190,000 to the Carolina Farm Stewardship Program to "promote sustainable farming." All of the multinational tobacco companies and one US company (PM USA) also discussed their financial support for reforestation programs that replaced trees cut down and used for fuel in curing tobacco leaves. 8 A non-profit organization, "Total Land Care," that addressed both sustainable agriculture and reforestation in several African tobacco growing countries, including Malawi, was supported by 4 tobacco companies (Imperial, JTI, PMI, and PM USA).
There was less agreement among companies on other aspects of responsible supply chain management and no real pattern in cases of agreement. For example, PM USA and its parent company Altria were the only two companies that mentioned an aspiration to contract with women and minority-owned businesses as evidence of responsible supply chain management, while Imperial and JTI were the only two to mention concerns about their suppliers' carbon footprint. PMI was alone in its pledge to avoid purchasing genetically modified tobacco.
Smoking-caused harm
Philip Morris USA executives have acknowledged that the decision to publicly acknowledge that smoking-caused disease was driven by a desire to improve the company's image; 19 thus, we considered such website admissions to be forms of CSR.
All tobacco companies mentioned that smoking caused harm to smokers. Altria's website elaborated the least, simply stating that "Altria's tobacco companies support several approaches to reducing the harm caused by tobacco products" without specifying the type of harm.
Lorillard's website, by contrast, noted that smoking caused "serious and fatal diseases" and listed thirty of them, including pancreatic, bladder, and renal cancer, and acute myeloid leukemia. Altria and Lorillard represented the two extremes in terms of health information provided on their websites; the remaining tobacco companies asserted, using similar language, that smoking caused "serious diseases" and listed four examples: lung cancer, heart disease, 9 emphysema, and bronchitis. Only BAT followed Lorillard's example and noted that these diseases were both serious and fatal. BAT and Imperial also noted that the link between smoking and disease had been determined by epidemiological studies, and pointed out that laboratory research conducted "over the years" (BAT) or over "decades" (Imperial) had failed to identify the particular component of cigarette smoke that caused disease. BAT stated that "[t]his means that science is still to determine which smokers will get a smoking related disease. Nor can science tell whether any individual became ill solely because they smoked."
Tobacco companies were less consistently willing to acknowledge harms related to secondhand smoke. Five companies (Altria, PMI, PM USA, BAT, and Lorillard) stated that one or more public health authorities had concluded that secondhand smoke caused lung cancer and heart disease in nonsmoking adults, and asthma, respiratory infections, and Sudden Infant Death Syndrome in children. Lorillard went further, noting that "exposure of adults to secondhand smoke has immediate adverse effects on the cardiovascular system" and that secondhand smoke caused both premature death and disease. Four of the companies that reported the conclusions of public health authorities (PMI, PM USA, Altria and Lorillard) advised the public to be "guided" by or "rely on" them when deciding whether to expose themselves to secondhand smoke. BAT, however, joined with Imperial and JTI in disputing the science linking secondhand smoke to disease. BAT and Imperial critiqued the epidemiological methods that underpinned the conclusion that secondhand smoking caused disease, while JTI simply stated that "[b]ased on the current science, JTI does not believe the claim has been proven that [environmental tobacco smoke] is a cause of disease such as lung cancer." RAI's website ignored the issue altogether, making no mention of secondhand smoke causing disease.
Location of CSR initiatives
Tobacco company websites mentioned CSR activities in 58 countries -all but 9 were parties to the FCTC (table 2) Africa were most often mentioned. In North America, the US was the predominant site of tobacco company CSR programs, most provided by US tobacco companies. Projects varied, and included YSP and environmental programs, domestic violence prevention, and support for the arts. In Africa, multinational tobacco companies had a more consistent presence than US companies: while every multinational mentioned at least 3 CSR programs in African nations, PM USA and Altria were the only US companies with a CSR presence there, and both mentioned the same "sustainable agriculture" program in Malawi. 27 Imperial Tobacco accounted for the bulk of African-based CSR projects (22/38), spread among 9 countries and the region as a whole.
Malawi and Tanzania attracted the most tobacco company attention, with 6 of 8 tobacco companies mentioning CSR programs in Malawi, and 4 companies mentioning programs in Tanzania. In   11 terms of the content of CSR programs, Africa-based initiatives were less varied than those in the US: one-half of all African programs concerned tree planting and sustainable agricultural practices.
Discussion
Tobacco companies had similar conceptualizations of some of the basic elements of CSR -YSP programs, supply chain management, voluntary marketing standards, and an acknowledgement of some of smoking's harms. Within each common focus area, however, there were some differences between individual companies and between US and multinational companies. US companies appeared to be more concerned than multinational companies about the issue of youth smoking, mentioning more comprehensive YSP programs and voluntary marketing practices whose ostensible goals were to minimize youth smoking. In addition, US companies, unlike their multinational counterparts, were less likely to dispute the science linking secondhand smoke to disease and death. These differences may reflect the particular legal and/or social environments in which companies operate. For example, although the tobacco industry as a whole has faced criticism for marketing to children, in the US, this criticism has been particularly acute, forming the basis in the late 1990s of an unsuccessful effort to regulate tobacco as a drug and an agreement by manufacturers to eliminate certain types of marketing. 28 Similarly, some US tobacco companies agreed in the late 1990s to no longer publicly debate smoking and health issues even if they disagreed with public health authorities. 29 Nonetheless, multinational companies appear to recognize that they share some of the same vulnerabilities as US companies, since they made some effort to address the issue of youth smoking and smoking's harms. Drawing public attention to these issues and the 12 contradictions they raise (for example, claiming not to want kids to smoke while continuing to engage in marketing practices that appeal to youth) may help undermine the credibility that tobacco companies seek to advance through CSR.
Among the 58 countries that hosted tobacco industry CSR projects, the vast majority were parties to the FCTC, a reflection of the low rate of adoption among FCTC signatories of the CSR restrictions recommended by Articles 5.3 and 13.
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The presence of numerous sub-Saharan African nations among these countries is particularly worrisome, given the growing importance of Africa as a regional market for tobacco products: in the coming decades, the African continent is expected to have the largest increase in smoking prevalence, absent any intervention. 30 CSR is one strategy that can help tobacco companies undermine effective tobacco control interventions. 12 It may also help reinforce African countries' commitment to tobacco growing. Malawi and Tanzania, the two African nations mentioned most often as CSR recipients, are among the top 20 global producers of tobacco leaf, and the crop plays an important role in both countries' economies. 31 Tobacco company tree planting and sustainable agricultural programs may help create or deepen alliances with local farmers, and deflect attention from the ongoing negative environmental impacts of tobacco growing. 32 Some reluctance on the part of low and middle income nations to prohibit tobacco industry CSR may stem from dependence on tobacco industry philanthropy for social services that the government is unlikely to provide. 6 A dedicated tax on tobacco companies would help overcome this hurdle. 6 For tobacco growing nations, intervention by tobacco control advocates is likely to be challenging, as witnessed by the difficulties faced by FCTC parties in addressing the issue of alternative crops; 33 however, creating and sustaining alliances with environmental 13 organizations (who have not accepted industry funds) 5 could add to the number of voices drawing attention to tobacco growing's environmental hazards.
Our finding that tobacco company websites advertised CSR projects in a handful of countries that have formally banned tobacco industry CSR highlights the importance of monitoring and enforcing such bans. Some governments may rely on a few underfunded tobacco control advocacy organizations to monitor and report tobacco company violations of the ban on CSR. Public and private funders of tobacco control initiatives should consider supporting programs to monitor CSR activity and legally enforce CSR bans. In cases where a dedicated tax on tobacco companies is not implemented as part of a CSR ban, they should also consider providing equivalent replacement resources for unmet needs.
Study limitations
Although we conducted a comprehensive search for CSR-related content on tobacco company websites, it is possible that we failed to capture some relevant content, particularly if it was not linked to a "responsibility" or "sustainability" heading and had not previously been identified as a CSR or public relations initiative. Moreover, it is unlikely that tobacco companies mentioned on their websites all of their CSR projects and every country in which the projects were located; thus, our findings represent a conservative estimate of the companies' CSR practices and locations.
Conclusions
Tobacco company websites reveal a shared vision of how tobacco companies define "responsibility": declaring an interest in reducing youth smoking, claiming to ameliorate some of the conditions under which tobacco is grown, stating that their marketing was limited to 14 adults, and acknowledging some of smoking's harms. The number and global reach of tobacco company CSR programs suggests not only that tobacco companies regard them as essential demonstrations of "responsibility," but also that they help accomplish the tobacco industry's political objectives. Full implementation of the FCTC's guidelines concerning tobacco industry CSR, which would involve prohibiting tobacco industry CSR as a form of sponsorship, is essential to block this avenue of influence.
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